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NOTES & COMMENTS
DEMYSTIFYING A LEGAL TWILIGHT ZONE:
RESOLVING THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT ON
WHEN SEIZURE ENDS AND PRETRIAL
DETENTION BEGINS IN § 1983 EXCESSIVE
FORCE CASES*
I. INTRODUCTION
Consider the following hypotheticals: Suspect A was arrested
by two police officers for driving with a suspended license. On her
way to the police station, one of the officers chose to sit in the back
of the patrol car with A. The officer told A how good she looked in
her tight black dress, placed his hand on her thigh and rubbed her
shoulders.
Now consider the situation in which Suspect B was brought to
the station house after having been arrested for assault and battery.
While B was awaiting the booking process, he began to yell obscen-
ities at the arresting officer. The officer got angry and beat, kicked,
and punched while B was handcuffed.
Both A and B would like to bring an excessive force action
against the officers.1 They want to show that the officers' use of
excessive force violated their constitutional rights. But, they have a
* The author would like to thank Professor Randolph Jonakait for his
thoughtful comments.
1 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). The relevant text of § 1983 reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regula-
tion, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an ac-
tion at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress,
except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act
or omission taken in such officer's judicial capacity, injunctive relief
shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or
declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section,
any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Co-
lumbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of
Columbia.
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threshold issue they must overcome: which constitutional rights
were violated by this alleged use of excessive force? The Fourth
Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure
protects a criminal suspect during an arrest.2 The Fourteenth
Amendment protects a "pretrial detainee" from "excessive force
that amounts to punishment,"' 3 and from police conduct that
"shocks the conscience." And, the Eighth Amendment protects a
convicted criminal from "cruel and unusual punishment."'4 Both A
and B had been arrested, but neither had been involved in a judicial
proceeding. Thus, they were not considered to be in the process of
being seized, nor were they considered as pretrial detainees or con-
victed criminals for the purposes of constitutional protection.
Herein lies what the Eighth Circuit has identified as a "legal twi-
light zone" 5: the gap between arrest and pretrial detention where
confusion reigns among the federal courts about which constitu-
tional protection to apply to plaintiffs in A's and B's positions.
This Note will examine the problems that have arisen as a re-
sult of this federal court confusion. Part II of this Note provides an
overview of Section 1983 jurisprudence and is divided into four sec-
tions. Section A presents an abbreviated history of Section 1983.
Section B outlines Section 1983 excessive force jurisprudence. Sec-
tion C discusses the seminal case in this area, Graham v. Connor.6
Section D examines the beginnings of the circuit court split. Part III
discusses the different approaches the federal courts have taken.
Part IV presents various cases in order to demonstrate how the cir-
cuit court split affects excessive force cases. Part V argues that the
Supreme Court should resolve this circuit court split by affording
Fourth Amendment protection to post-arrest, pre-charge detainees
who are victims of excessive force by government officials. This
Note concludes in Part VI that this circuit court split should be re-
solved in order to give victims of excessive force, namely post-ar-
2 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
3 Id. at 395 note 10 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535-39 (1979)); see
also County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 118 (1998); Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165 (1952).
4 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
5 Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 715 (8th Cir. 2000) (Judge Bowman, in dis-
cussing which constitutional protection is afforded to persons who have been ar-
rested but are not yet deemed "pretrial detainees," referred to the issue as
"something of a legal twilight zone").
6 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386.
940 [Vol. XIX
2003] EXCESSIVE FORCE 941
rest, pre-charge detainees, the constitutional protection they
deserve so that they may bring Section 1983 cases more effectively.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF 42 U.S.C. § 1983 ExCESSIVE FORCE
CLAIMS AND THE CIRCUIT COURT SPLIT
A. An Abbreviated History of §1983
Congress enacted Section 1983 to provide a remedy to parties
deprived of constitutional rights, privileges, and immunities by a
government official's abuse of his position.7 Section 1983 is a
method for vindicating rights conferred by the United States Con-
stitution and other federal statutes, rather than a source of substan-
tive rights." The purpose of this remedy is to protect individuals
from the misuse of state power, which is made possible only be-
cause of the government official's authority of state law. 9
Congress originally enacted Section 1983 as part of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.10 Otherwise known as the Ku Klux Klan Act,
the 1871 Act was passed to provide redress for those citizens whose
constitutional rights had been violated, especially freed slaves
whose due process rights had been infringed." The law was specifi-
cally intended to restrict government actors directly involved with
the Ku Klux Klan.12 As a result of this narrow intent, Section 1983
was rarely invoked. 13 However, in 1961, the Supreme Court wid-
ened the scope of Section 1983 when it decided, in Monroe v. Pape,
that Section 1983 constitutes a federal remedy for deprivation of
7 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003); Reginald R. White II, Recent Development:
Brothers v. Klevenhagen: The Fifth Circuit Gives Its Imprimatur to the Indiscrimi-
nate Use of Deadly Force against Escaping Pretrial Detainees, 69 TUL. L. REV. 1051
(1995).
8 42 U.S.C. § 1983; White III, supra note 7.
9 42 U.S.C. § 1983; White III, supra note 7.
10 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (detailing legislative history re-
garding the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871); See also Kathryn E. Scar-
borough & Craig Hernmens, Section 1983 Suits Against Law Enforcement in the
Circuit Courts of Appeal, 21 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
11 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; see also Scarborough & Hemmens,
supra note 10, at 7.
12 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; see also Scarborough & Hemmens,
supra note 10, at 7.
13 See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167; see also Scarborough & Hemmens,
supra note 10, at 7.
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constitutional rights by state officials; and is available as a supple-
ment to a state remedy. 14
B. Excessive Force Jurisprudence and § 1983
Plaintiffs bringing an excessive force claim under Section 1983
must prove that the defendant deprived them of a "specific consti-
tutional right,"'1 5 and that the deprivation occurred "under the color
of state law.' 1 6 The first step in a Section 1983 inquiry is to deter-
mine which of the plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated.1 7 In
so doing, the court arrives at the standard under which to analyze
the plaintiff's excessive force claim. 18 Courts have applied the
Fourth 19, Eighth20 , and Fourteenth 2' Amendments to protect the
arrestee's "personal security. '22 The plaintiff's status as a person
undergoing seizure, a pretrial detainee, or a convicted person deter-
14 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167.
15 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
16 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003); See also Monroe, 365 U.S. at 184. (defining
"under the color of state law" as "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state
law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of
state law) (citing United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)).
17 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. at 394.
18 Id.
19 The Fourth Amendment states:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, pa-
pers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall
not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describ-
ing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
20 The Eighth Amendment states: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S.
CONST. amend. VIII.
21 The Fourteenth Amendment states:
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the
State wherein they reside. No state shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
22 Kathryn R. Urbonya, Public School Officials' Use of Physical Force as a
Fourth Amendment Seizure: Protecting Students from the Constitutional Chasm be-
tween the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 16
(2000).
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mines which constitutional protection he is afforded. 23 The federal
judiciary was divided regarding this protection issue24 until 1989,
when the Supreme Court decided Graham v. Connor.
25
This division was spurred by the Court's 1952 decision in
Rochin v. California,26 which held that the criminal defendant's
substantive due process rights had been violated when police forced
an emetic into his stomach to retrieve evidence for a narcotics
case. 27 The Court said that the police officer's conduct "shocked the
conscience," and reversed the defendant's conviction for illegal pos-
session of morphine. 28 Then, in 1968, the Supreme Court defined
the term "seizure" in Terry v. Ohio, so as to clarify when Fourth
Amendment protections become available to a seized person.
29
However, the Court still had not decided which constitutional pro-
tections to afford pretrial detainees.
In 1973, Judge Friendly, writing for the Second Circuit in John-
son v. Glick,30 established four factors for determining if police use
of force against pretrial detainees is constitutional: (1) the need for
the application of force; (2) the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used; (3) the extent of the injury in-
flicted; and (4) whether force was applied in a good faith effort to
maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the
23 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 394 (1989).
24 Mitchell W. Karsch, Excessive Force and the Fourth Amendment: When
Does Seizure End?, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 823, 841 n.2 (1990).
25 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (holding that "all claims that law enforcement
officers have used excessive force - deadly or not - in the course of an arrest,
investigatory stop, or other "seizure" of a free citizen should be analyzed under the
Fourth Amendment and its "reasonableness" standard, rather than under a "sub-
stantive due process approach").
26 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
27 Id.
28 Id.
29 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The Court first defined "seizure" when it
stated: "Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens
involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or
show of authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we con-
clude that a seizure has occurred." Id. at 20 n.16.
30 Johnson v. Glick,. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973). In Glick, a pretrial de-
tainee claimed that he was injured by a police officer, who struck him three times
in the head. The court held that the pretrial detainee could proceed with his § 1983
claim because his Fourteenth Amendment "liberty" right to substantive due pro-
cess had been violated by the police officer's use of force. Judge Friendly noted "it
would be absurd to hold that a pretrial detainee has less constitutional protection
against acts of prison guards than one who has been convicted." Id. at 1032.
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very purpose of causing harm. 31 The Second Circuit held that a
guard's unprovoked attack on a suspect in pretrial detention
crossed the 'constitutional line'. 32 Judge Friendly used a substantive
due process standard to make this determination.
33
After a number of federal courts adopted the Glick test,34 the
Supreme Court decided Bell v. Wolfish, which confirmed that the
due process clause is the proper textual source of protection of pre-
trial detainees.35 The Supreme Court defined "pretrial detainees"
as those persons "who have been charged with a crime but who
have not yet been tried on the charge. ' 36 The Court held that due
process requires that pretrial detainees not be punished, since they
have not had an adjudication of guilt.3 7 Therefore, the Due Process
Clause protects pretrial detainees from being subjected to- condi-
tions or restrictions that amount to punishment. 38 If a condition or
restriction is reasonably related to a legitimate government objec-
tive, it does not amount to "punishment. '39 On the other hand, if a
restriction or condition is arbitrary or purposeless, a court may infer
that it is punishment.40 The Court, however, did not mention either
the Rochin "shocks the conscience" test or the Glick test.41
Following its recognition of the source of constitutional protec-
tion for pretrial detainees, the Supreme Court identified the source
of protection for those individuals who were killed during seizure
by government officials' use of deadly force.42 The Garner Court
held that the indiscriminate use of deadly force against all fleeing
free individuals suspected of a felony was unreasonable and thus
excessive. 43 The Court also held that the force used during arrest is
to be evaluated by "balancing the nature and quality of the intru-
31 Id. at 1033.
32 Id. (relying on Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952)).
33 Id.
34 See e.g., Hampton v. Holmesburg Prison Officials, 546 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir.
1976); Brown v. Mandel, 534 F.2d 328 (4th Cir. 1976); Anderson v. Nosser, 456
F.2d 835 (5th Cir. 1972); Suits v. Lynch, 437 F.Supp. 38 (D. Kan. 1977).
35 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
36 Id. at 523.
37 Id. at 536.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 539.
40 Id.
41 See generally id. at 520.
42 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the Fourth Amend-
ment protects free individuals from the unreasonable use of deadly force).
43 Id. at 11.
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sion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the
importance of the governmental interests alleged to justify the in-
trusion. '44 However, the Court qualified the prohibition against
deadly force by holding that a state official may use deadly force if
he or she has probable cause to believe that the suspect "poses a
threat of serious physical harm" to either the official or others.45
In 1985, the Supreme Court held in Whitley v. Albers that the
Eighth Amendment protects inmates from the use of excessive
force that amounts to cruel and unusual punishment. 46 In so doing,
the Court held that an official's use of force against an inmate is
excessive if the official applied it "maliciously and sadistically" to
cause harm rather than "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore
discipline.'67
C. Graham v. Connor
The next case in the line of this jurisprudence defining consti-
tutional protections in Section 1983 cases was Graham v. Connor.
48
Prior to this decision, some federal courts applied the Fourteenth
Amendment to claims of excessive force during seizure, while
others applied the Fourth Amendment. 49 In Graham, the Supreme
Court held that excessive force claims are not governed by a single
standard. 50 Rather, the plaintiff must identify the specific source of
constitutional right allegedly violated by an official's use of exces-
sive force.51 The validity of the claim will then be judged by the
constitutional standard governing that right, rather than by a gen-
eral right to excessive force standard.
52
The Supreme Court further held that the Fourth Amendment
protects against excessive force arising during arrest, investigatory
stops, or other seizures. 53 The Supreme Court determined that since
the Fourth Amendment provides "an explicit textual source of con-
stitutional protection against this sort of physically intrusive govern-
44 Id. at8.
45 Id. at 11.
46 Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
47 Id. at 320-21.
48 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
49 Id. at 393 (citing R. Wilson Freyermuth, Rethinking Excessive Force, 1987
DUKE L. J. 692, 694-96, nn. 16-23 ( 1987) (collecting cases)).
50 Id. at 393.
51 Id. at 394.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 395.
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mental conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion
of 'substantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
claims." 5
4
"The 'reasonableness' of a particular seizure depends not only
on when it is made, but on how it is carried out. '55 In Graham, the
Supreme Court stated that the test of reasonableness is an objective
one. 56 That is, "the question is whether the officers' actions are 'ob-
jectively reasonable' in light of the facts and circumstances con-
fronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation. '57 Courts must conduct the reasonableness inquiry
without regard to the underlying motives or intent of the police of-
ficers. 58 To determine if the police officers' use of force is reasona-
ble, courts must balance the nature and quality of the intrusion on
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the govern-
mental interests at stake.5 9 "In particular, courts should examine:
(1) the severity of the crime at issue; (2) whether the suspect posed
an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others; and (3)
whether the suspect resisted or attempted to evade arrest by
flight." 60 Since the Court acknowledged the fact that "police of-
ficers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in circum-
stances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-about the
amount of force that is necessary in a particular situation, ' '61 police
receive a wide latitude of protection in cases involving potential
danger and emergency situations. 62
D. The Circuit Court Split
Plaintiffs bringing excessive force claims under Section 1983
must first establish which constitutional right has been violated by
an officer's use of excessive force. 63 Before Graham v. Connor, the
circuit courts were split on whether to apply Fourth Amendment
54 Id.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 397.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 397.
59 Id. at 396.
60 Thompson v. City of Meriden, No. 3:94-CV-1950(EBB), 1999 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 6991, at *19 (Dist. Conn. Apr. 14, 1999), (citing Graham, 490 U.S. at 397;
Hemphill v. Schott, 141 F.3d 412 (2d Cir. 1998)).
61 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
62 Thompson, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6991, at *20.
63 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386.
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protection or Fourteenth Amendment protection to arrestees or
pretrial detainees who were allegedly subjected to excessive force
by a government official.64 Although the Supreme Court attempted
to resolve this issue by defining which constitutional protection ex-
tends to arrestees during seizure in Graham v. Connor, the Court
did not address the crucial issue of which constitutional protection
is afforded to those who have been arrested but have yet to make
their first judicial appearance. 65 The Supreme Court stated:
Our cases have not resolved the question whether the
Fourth Amendment continues to provide individuals
with protection against the deliberate use of excessive
physical force beyond the point at which arrest ends
and pretrial detention begins, and we do not attempt to
answer that question today. It is clear however that the
Due Process Clause protects a pretrial detainee from
the use of excessive force that amounts to punishment
[citations omitted]. After. conviction, the Eighth
Amendment 'serves as the primary source of substan-
tive protection... in cases.., where the deliberate use
of force is challenged as excessive and unjustified [cita-
tions omitted].66
In failing to decide whether the Fourth Amendment extends to
persons who had been arrested, and thus seized, but who have yet
to make their first judicial appearance, the Supreme Court invited
the federal courts to determine which constitutional protection is
afforded during this time period [hereinafter referred to as "the gap
period"]. 67 As a result, the circuit courts are still split on the issue.68
64 Prior to Graham, the Ninth Circuit established the notion of continuing
seizure. Albritten v. Dougherty County, 973 F. Supp. 1455, 1460 (M.D. Ga. 1997)
(citing Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985)). Under this ap-
proach, the Ninth Circuit held that "once a seizure has occurred, it continues
throughout the time the arrestee is in the custody of the arresting officers." Rob-
ins, 773 F.2d at 1010.
65 Graham, 490 U.S. at 395.
66 Id.
67 Courts also refer to this period as "post-arrest, pre-charge custody" or
"post-arrest, pre-arraignment custody." See Albritten, 973 F. Supp. at 1459.
68 The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits follow the Ninth Cir-
cuit's continuing seizure approach. See Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871 (9th Cir.
2001); Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1989); Blake v. Base, 90-CV-0008,
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14659, *1 (N.D. N.Y. Sept. 14, 1998); Thompson v. City of
20031 947
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III. THE DIFFERENT APPROACHES
Circuit courts have developed two different approaches to de-
fining when seizure ends and pretrial detention begins. Courts use
these approaches so that they may determine whether to apply the
Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment to Section 1983
claims by plaintiffs who were allegedly victims of excessive force
during the gap period.
A. Continuing Seizure Approach
Prior to Graham, the Ninth Circuit established the notion of
continuing seizure.69 Under this approach, "once a seizure has oc-
curred, it continues throughout the time the arrestee is in the cus-
tody of the arresting officers. 70 This holding was most recently
reaffirmed in a 2001 Ninth Circuit case, in which the plaintiff was
allegedly sexually harassed on her way to the police station after
being arrested for driving under the influence. 71 The court stated,
"The Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable search
and seizure continues to apply after an arrestee is in the custody of
the arresting officers. ' 72
Meriden, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6991 (Dist. Conn. Apr. 14, 1999); U.S.'v. John-
stone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997); Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174
(3d Cir. 1998); Young v. City of Philadelphia, No. 01-1678, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
13499, at *1, *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2001); McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th
Cir. 1988); Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996); Guzinski v. Hasselbach,
920 F. Supp. 762 (E.D. Mi. 1996); Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713 (8th Cir. 2000);
Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991); Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239
F.3d 1183 (10th Cir. 2001). The Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, and Eleventh Circuits use
the Fourteenth Amendment when evaluating § 1983 claims of excessive force. See
Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc); Riley v. Dorton,
115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997); Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir. 1993);
Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994); Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190
(7th Cir. 1989); Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990); Wright V.
Whiddon, 951 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1992); Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049 (7th
Cir. 1996); Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996). See also Pyka v.
Village of Orland Park, 906 F. Supp. 1196, 1219-20 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (discussing
circuit court split).
69 Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (holding that excessive use of force by a
law enforcement officer in the course of transporting an arrestee gives rise to a
section 1983 claim based upon a violation of the Fourth Amendment).
70 Id. at 1010.
71 Fontana v. Haskin, 262 F.3d 871.
72 Id. at 879-880 n.5 (noting the circuit court split). The court also held:
The trip to the police station is a 'continuing seizure' during which
the police are obliged to treat their suspects in a reasonable manner
948
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In those circuits following a continuing seizure approach, the
plaintiff bringing a Section 1983 excessive force claim must prove
that the government official violated his Fourth Amendment right
against unreasonable search and seizure.73 Circuit courts will apply
the objective reasonableness test established in Graham v. Connor
when determining whether or not the detainee's rights were
violated.
74
In determining whether the force was reasonable, courts must
balance "the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's
Fourth Amendment interests against the countervailing govern-
ment interests at stake. '75 The reasonableness inquiry is an objec-
tive one, taken "from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the
scene, rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. ' 76 Since "po-
lice officers are often forced to make split-second judgments-in
circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving-
about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular situa-
tion," the query must take into account the nature of the police
officer's job.77 However, the officers' intent or motivation is not rel-
evant.78 Thus, post-arrest, pre-charge detainees who reside in juris-
dictions that use the continuing seizure approach must satisfy an
objective reasonableness test when proving to the court which con-
stitutional right has been violated by a government official.
B. Substantive Due Process Approach
According to the Supreme Court, the Fourth Amendment "ap-
plies to the initial decision to detain the accused, not to the condi-
[citations omitted]. Haskin's alleged abuse of power constituted an
unreasonable seizure, an unreasonable intrusion into Fontana's
bodily integrity, and an exercise of continuing dominion over a
criminal suspect in custody; these facts raise the same constitutional
question raised in Robins. Fontana's claim squarely raises a Fourth
Amendment claim.
Id.
73 Robins, 773 F.2d at 1007.
74 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (holding that excessive force
claims arising during seizure should be examined under a Fourth Amendment
analysis). The continuing seizure approach extends the notion of seizure into the
gap period, hence the Fourth Amendment protection to post-arrest, pre-trial de-
tainees. Id.
75 Id. at 396.
76 Id.
77 Id. at 397.
78 Id.
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tions of confinement after that decision has been made." 79
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has defined "seizure" as "a single
act, and not a continuous fact." 80 Thus, several circuits have held
that the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard
applies to an arrestee who has been subjected to excessive force
during the gap period.
81
To succeed on a claim of excessive force under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the plaintiff must show that
the use of force imposed by the government official amounted to
punishment.82 The relevant inquiry is whether the force was applied
in "a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline or mali-
ciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm. 83 The
plaintiffs must prove that the defendants "inflicted unnecessary
wanton pain and suffering" in order to prove that the force
amounted to punishment. 84
IV. THE CIRCUITS' APPLICATION OF THE
DIFFERENT APPROACHES
A. Continuing Seizure Approach
The Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits fol-
low the continuing seizure approach. The following paragraphs pre-
sent cases in which this approach was used.
The Second Circuit hesitantly adopted the continuing approach
in Powell v. Gardner.8 5 In Powell, the plaintiff sued his arresting
officers for excessive force after they allegedly beat him while he
was detained at the police station.86 The plaintiff sustained a broken
wrist.87 In deciding whether or not to extend Fourth Amendment
protection to the plaintiff, the court held, "We think the Fourth
Amendment standard probably should be applied at least to the
period prior to the time when the person arrested is arraigned or
79 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 533-34 (1979).
80 California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 625 (1991).
81 See Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997) (discussing circuit court
split).
82 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520.
83 Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479, 483 (4th Cir. 1998) (citing Johnson v.
Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
84 Id. (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 320 (1986)).
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formally charged, and remains in the custody (sole or joint) of the
arresting officer."'88 The Second Circuit did not overrule Johnson v.
Glick,8 9 but in light of Graham v. Connor, it decided to use a
wholly objective standard (the continuing seizure approach), rather
than use Glick's part subjective, part objective standard.90 The Sec-
ond Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of the case and
remanded the case for trial. 91
In 1998, this holding was reaffirmed by a district court in the
Second Circuit in a case where the plaintiff was allegedly viciously
restrained, attacked, and beaten by police officers after he arrived
at the police station.92 However, the district court held that the of-
ficers' actions did not give rise to an excessive force claim because it
was'reasonable under the circumstances since the plaintiff had shot
and killed an officer before he was arrested. 93
The Sixth Circuit also follows the continuing seizure approach.
The Sixth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's continuing seizure ap-
proach in McDowell v. Rogers,94 which also was decided prior to
Graham. In McDowell, a police officer allegedly hit the plaintiff
twice with a nightstick, while the plaintiff was handcuffed, causing a
broken rib.95 The court applied the Fourth Amendment to the ar-
restee's claim, holding that "seizure that occurs when a person is
arrested continues throughout the time the person remains in the
custody of arresting officers. ' 96 As a result, the court reversed a
directed verdict in favor of one of three police officers, stating
"there is nothing trivial about a broken rib caused by a completely
unprovoked and unnecessary blow from a policeman's
nightstick."
97
88 Id. at 1044.
89 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973).
90 Powell, 891 F.2d at 1043-44.
91 Id. at 1044.
92 Blake v. Base, 90-CV-0008, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14659, *1 (N.D. N.Y.
Sept. 14, 1998) The court noted that there has been a lack of case law on the issue
of whether to apply the Powell standard or the Glick standard. It stated that "after
Powell it seems that if confronted squarely with the issue, the Second Circuit
would hold that when a plaintiff alleges that excessive force was used against him
before he was arraigned or formally charged, the Fourth Amendment governs such
a claim". Id. at *38, *40.
93 Id. at *42-*43.
94 McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988).
95 Id. at 1305.
96 Id. at 1306.
97 Id. at 1307.
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This approach was reaffirmed in Cox v. Treadway,98 when the
Sixth Circuit held that:
The jury should have been instructed that it is unrea-
sonable and thus a violation of the Fourth Amendment
for a police officer, acting under color of law, to use
physical force on a citizen who has been arrested and
restrained, who is securely under the control of the po-
lice, and who is not attempting to escape. 99
In Cox v. Treadway, two plaintiffs, Cox and Burgan, brought
excessive force claims against state police officers. 100 Cox alleged
that after being arrested, one of the defendant police officers hit
him twice with his fist, and then stuck a gun in his mouth and
threatened to kill him.101 Burgan alleged that after being arrested
on drug charges, the defendant police officers took him back to his
house to look for marijuana, where he was taken to the bedroom
and choked and hit by the defendants. 10 2 However, the jury found
in favor of the defendants and the Court of Appeals affirmed. 10 3
One week later, a Sixth Circuit district court applied the
continuing seizure approach to an excessive force claim, in which
the defendants allegedly restrained plaintiff in a manner that in-
jured his arm while the plaintiff left the booking room area at the
police station (against defendants' orders) to use the bathroom. 10 4
The court found in favor of the defendant because plaintiff did not
submit any evidence to rebut defendant's motion to dismiss.10 5
Like the Ninth, Second, and Sixth Circuits, the Eighth, Third,
and Tenth Circuits have adopted the continuing seizure approach.
The Eighth Circuit held in Wilson v. Spain that the Fourth Amend-
98 Cox v..Treadway, 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996) (holding that "Fourth
Amendment post-restraint [jury] instruction should have been given as an addi-
tional instruction to ensure that the jury was not misled as to the amount of force
that could be used after the suspects were restrained and securely under the con-
trol of the police").
99 Id. at 233-234.
100 Id. at 230.
101 Id. at 233.
102 Id.
103 Id. at 242.
104 Guzinski v. Hasselbach, 920 F. Supp. 762, 766 n.2-5 (E.D.M.I. 1996) (hold-
ing that "defendant Hasselbach's application of force to subdue plaintiff at the
Oakland County Jail is to be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment") (noting
the Circuit Court split).
105 Id. at 769.
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ment was the correct source of constitutional protection for a post-
arrest, pre-arraignment plaintiff who alleged excessive force by an
officer who pushed a holding cell door into him, knocking him un-
conscious. 106 In so doing, the court cited two cases: a 1998 case in
which it held that the Fourth Amendment applied to as situation
where officers at a jail used force against an arrestee who was being
violent and disruptive during the booking process,10 7 and a 1997
case in which the Fourth Amendment was used to analyze a situa-
tion where a police officer used force against an arrestee who was
restrained in the back of a police car. 10 8 In Wilson v. Spain, the
court found in favor of the defendants because the officer could not
see that the plaintiff was standing behind the door when he opened
it.109
The Third Circuit has been struggling with this issue since Gra-
ham was decided. 1 0 However, the court has held that Fourth
Amendment protection extends to the "boundary between arrest
and pretrial detention."'' The confusion in the Third Circuit led to
the dismissal of a claim of excessive force." 2 In Young v. City of
Philadelphia, the plaintiff alleged that the defendants handcuffed
him too tightly, punched him, and slammed him against his truck.11 3
106 Wilson v. Spain, 209 F.3d 713, 716 (8th Cir. 2000).
107 Id. at 715 (citing Moore v. Novak, 143 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1998)).
108 Id. (citing Mayard v. Hopwood, 105 F.3d 1226 (8th Cir. 1997)).
109 Id.
110 U.S. v. Johnstone, 107 F.3d 200, 206-07 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that "where
the seizure ends and pre-trial detention begins is a difficult question"). However,
the court stated:
In holding that Johnstone carried out each of the assaults during
the course of arrest, we observe that a "seizure" can be a process, a
kind of continuum, and is not necessarily a discrete moment of ini-
tial restraint. Graham shows us that a citizen can remain "free" for
Fourth Amendment purposes for some time after he or she is
stopped by police and even handcuffed. Hence, pre-trial detention
does not necessarily begin the moment that a suspect is not free to
leave; rather, the seizure can continue and the Fourth Amendment
protection against unreasonable seizures can apply beyond that
point. Id.
111 Torres v. McLaughlin, 163 F.3d 169, 174 (3d Cir. 1998) (citing U.S. v. John-
stone, Id.).
112 Young v. City of Philadelphia, No. 01-1678, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13499,
at *1, *9 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 27, 2001) (holding that the Fourth Amendment governs a
plaintiff's excessive force claim based on the defendants' allegedly making the
handcuffs too tight upon arresting the plaintiff).
113 Id.
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However, the district court held in favor of the defendants because
the plaintiff pleaded a Fourteenth Amendment violation rather
than a Fourth Amendment violation and did not amend his com-
plaint in a timely manner.
114
The Tenth Circuit held in 1991 that "Fourth Amendment pro-
tections persist post-arrest."'1 15 In Austin v. Hamilton, the plaintiffs
alleged that they were repeatedly assaulted and denied use of the
bathroom while being detained for more than twelve hours after a
small amount of marijuana was found in their vehicle. 116 At no time
were plaintiffs formally placed under arrest or told why they were
being held. 117 After reviewing the circuit court split, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held:
Just as the Fourth Amendment's strictures continue in
effect to set the applicable constitutional limitations re-
garding both duration (reasonable period under the
circumstances of arrest) and legal justification (judicial
determination of probable cause), its protections also
persist to impose restrictions on the treatment of the
arrestee detained without a warrant."
8
The court held that the district court properly denied summary
judgment.
B. Substantive Due Process Approach
The Fourth and Fifth Circuits follow the substantive due pro-
cess method, while courts in the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits fol-
low both the substantive due process and continuing seizure
approach. The following paragraphs present cases where this ap-
proach was used.
114 Id.
115 Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991).
116 Id. at 1157.
117 Id.
118 Id. at 1160; see generally Cruz v. City of Laramie, 239 F.3d 1183 (10th Cir.
2001) (holding that review of a district court's finding of facts sufficient to support
a claimed violation of plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights was outside of the
Court of Appeal's jurisdiction). This case involved an excessive force claim against
defendant police officers who allegedly hog-tied the decedent plaintiff after subdu-
ing and arresting him. The plaintiff, who had a large amount of cocaine in his
system, died. However, based on qualified immunity, the court reversed the district
court's denial of summary judgment on the plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims.
EXCESSIVE FORCE
In 1994, the Fourth Circuit held in Norman v. Taylor1 19 that
"absent the most extraordinary circumstances, a plaintiff cannot
prevail on an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim if his injury
is de minimus.' 120 In 1997, the Fourth Circuit extended the Norman
holding to excessive force claims brought by pretrial detainees.
121
In Riley v. Dorton, the plaintiff, after having been arrested and
while awaiting booking, was quarreling with the defendant. 122 Ac-
cording to the plaintiff, the defendant got angry and shoved a pen a
quarter of an inch into the plaintiff's nose, and threatened to rip it
open.123 The defendant then allegedly threatened to throw him into
a corner and beat him up, and then slapped the plaintiff across the
face.124 There was no medical evidence to support the plaintiff's
claims. 125 The Circuit Court held that the plaintiff's claims were
properly analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment and that the
"purely de minimus level of injury alleged by this inveterate mal-
content does not constitute the kind of excessive force amounting
to punishment that Bell requires."'1 26 The court held that " . . . the
Fourth Amendment does not embrace a theory of 'continuing
seizure' and does not extend to the alleged mistreatment of ar-
restees or pretrial detainees in custody."'
1 27
This holding was reaffirmed in a 1998 Fourth Circuit case. 128 In
Taylor v. McDuffie, the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's
grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants because plaintiff
received de minimus injuries. At the same time, the Fourth Circuit
noted that the district court should have used a Fourteenth Amend-
ment analysis rather than a Fourth Amendment analysis in deter-
mining whether excessive force was used by defendant when he
allegedly threatened plaintiff with a gun, threw him on the ground,
119 Norman v. Taylor, 25 F.3d 1259, 1263 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc).
120 Id. at 1263 (citing Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1 (1992)).
121 Riley v. Dorton, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997).





127 Id. at 1164. The court also stated that "the requirements for securing a
warrant have nothing to tell us about the conditions controlling subsequent deten-
tion. By its own terms, the Fourth Amendment thus applies to the 'initial decision
to detain an accused,' [citation omitted] not to the conditions of confinement after
that decision has been made." Id. at 1163.
128 Taylor v. McDuffie, 155 F.3d 479 (4th Cir. 1998).
20031 955
956 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. [Vol. XIX
and hit him in order to retrieve a driver's license that plaintiff was
hiding in his mouth.
The Fifth Circuit also uses the substantive due process ap-
proach to provide constitutional protection to post-arrest, pre-
charge detainees. In 1994, relying on Valencia v. Wiggins,129 the
Fifth Circuit held that "once an individual has been arrested and is
placed into police custody, and surely after the arresting officer has
transferred the individual to a jail cell, the individual becomes a
pretrial detainee, protected against excessive force by the Due Pro-
cess Clause." 130 In Brothers, the decedent was arrested and brought
to the station house, where he spent a couple of hours in a jail
cell. 131 However, the decedent was wanted in another county, so the
defendants transported him there. 32 As the defendant police of-
ficers exited the car and checked their weapons, the decedent set
himself free of the handcuffs and began to run. 133 The police of-
ficers yelled for him to stop, but when he did not do so, they fired
their guns twelve times, killing him.134 The Fifth Circuit affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the de-
fendants. 35 The Court reasoned:
Until the detainee is released from custody, this status
never reverts back to that of mere suspect. Any other
conclusion would lead to the anomalous result of the
pretrial escapees' receiving greater protection than
those detainees who peacefully remain in their cells.
Thus, the force used against Brothers should be judged
under the Due Process Clause.' 36
129 Valencia v. Wiggins, 981 F.2d 1440 (5th Cir.) (1993). The court held:
We do not believe that the Fourth Amendment provides an appro-
priate constitutional basis for protecting against deliberate official
uses of force occurring. . .after the incidents of arrest are com-
pleted, after the plaintiff has been released from the arresting of-
ficer's custody, and after the plaintiff has been in detention
awaiting trial for a significant period of time.
Id. at 1443-44.
130 Brothers v. Klevenhagen, 28 F.3d 452 (5th Cir. 1994).




135 Id. at 457.
136 Id.
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The Seventh Circuit's approach to the gap period has been
somewhat ambiguous. 137 In 1989, the Seventh Circuit adopted the
substantive due process approach, one month before the Supreme
Court handed down the Graham decision. In Wilkins v. May, the
court held that once an arrest has taken place and the arrestee has
been placed securely in custody, the seizure is over and the individ-
ual is no longer protected by the Fourth Amendment, but rather by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.138 The
court stated, "If ever there were a strong case for substantive due
process, it would be a case in which a person who had been arrested
but not charged or convicted was brutalized while in custody. ' 139 In
Wilkins, while interrogating the plaintiff, the FBI held a gun three
inches from his head despite the fact that he was in their custody,
handcuffed, and seated. 140 The Seventh Circuit remanded the case
with instructions for the district court to consider whether the gov-
ernment officials' behavior shocked the conscience.
14'
Conversely, one year after Graham was decided, the Seventh
Circuit held that "most of the time the propriety of using force on a
person in custody pending trial will track the Fourth Amend-
ment. .... ",142 However, the Titran court did note with approval
Wilkins' holding that presence in the jail and the completion of the
booking marked the line between "arrest" and "detention".
43
Therefore, although both Seventh Circuit cases define when
seizure ends and pre-trial detention begins in the same manner,
they call for the application of entirely different constitutional stan-
dards. As a result, the Seventh Circuit continues to apply both the
substantive due process and the continuing seizure approaches to
post-arrest, pre-charge detainees.'
44
137 See Pyka v. Village of Orland Park, 906 F. Supp. 1196, 1219-1225 (N.D.I.L.
1995) (analyzing circuit court split and holding that the Fourth Amendment will
apply during the gap period).
138 Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1989). The court was concerned that
extending Fourth Amendment protection to the gap period "could lead to an un-
warranted expansion of constitutional law." Id. at 194.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 192. The court said the plaintiff appeared "as harmless as a mouse."
141 Id. at 195.
142 Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990).
143 Id.
144 See e.g., Reed v. City of Chicago, 77 F.3d 1049 (7th Cir. 1996) The court
stated that although the continuing seizure notion is "intriguing", the Seventh Cir-
cuit declined to adopt the approach in Wilkins. Id. at 1052 n.3; see also Wells v.
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The Eleventh Circuit has followed both the substantive due
process and continuing seizure approach. In 1992, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit reversed a district court's holding that the defendant police of-
ficers were not entitled to qualified immunity. 145 In Wright, the
decedent plaintiff, a career criminal, was in the custody of defen-
dant after being arrested and having confessed to an armed rob-
bery. 146 When he was arrested, the decedent plaintiff was on
probation, so defendant's deputy took him to the county court-
house for a probation revocation hearing. 147 Both the deputy and
the defendant left the decedent plaintiff in the courtroom and in-
structed the bailiff to keep an eye on him. 148 Once the officers left
him alone, the decedent plaintiff walked from the courtroom and
ran from the courthouse.1 49 The defendants chased him and ended
up fatally shooting him.'
50
The plaintiff, decedent's executor, brought an excessive force
claim under the Fourth Amendment.' 51 The district court denied
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the basis of quali-
fied immunity.152 The Eleventh Circuit reversed, holding that
whether the Fourth Amendment did apply to a "person who had
been captured, arrested, and detained awaiting trial, who then
sought to escape custody" had not been clearly established at the
time the officers used deadly force.' 53 However, the Court went on
to say that "it is clear ... that the Due Process Clause protects a
pretrial detainee from the use of excessive force that amounts to
punishment [citation omitted]. Wright's parents do not make a due
process claim, so we need not address that issue."'
1 54
City of Chicago, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4417, *20-21 (N.D.I.L. 1999) (discussing
confusion among the courts in the Seventh Circuit).
145 Wright v. Whiddon, 951 F.2d 297 (11th Cir. 1992). Qualified immunity
shields "government officials performing discretionary functions from liability for
civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory
or constitutional rights or [those rights of] which a reasonable person would have
known." Id. at 299 (citing Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).











In 1996, the Eleventh Circuit clarified Wright's insinuation that
the Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process standard ap-
plies to post-arrest, pre-arraignment plaintiffs. 155 This case involved
an arrestee who died from positional asphyxia as he was being
transported in the back of a police car after his arrest.156 After a
struggle ensued between the decedent and the defendants, the de-
fendants placed the decedent in handcuffs and leg restraints. They
then placed him in a police car with his feet on the rear seat and his
head in the space between the front and rear seats. In this position,
the decedent was unable to breathe and because of the handcuffs
and leg restraints, could not reposition himself. The decedent died
on the way to the police station. 157 The court held that "claims in-
volving the mistreatment of arrestees or pretrial detainees in cus-
tody are governed by the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause."'1 58 However, the court then went on to say that excessive
force claims and in custody mistreatment claims are judged by dif-
ferent legal standards, and thus held that the Fourth Amendment
should be used to analyze this plaintiff's excessive force claim.' 59
The defendants were granted summary judgment on both the mis-
treatment in custody claim and the excessive force claim.a60
V. THE SUPREME COURT MUST RESOLVE THIS CIRCUIT COURT
SPLIT IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE CIVIL RIGHTS OF
POST-ARREST, PRE-CHARGE DETAINEES
Because the Supreme Court has not addressed the issue of
which constitutional protection should be afforded to post-arrest,
pre-charge detainees who are victims of excessive force, the circuit
courts have been forced to come up with their own solutions. As a
result, the circuits are split on the issue, and the law is not being
applied uniformly. Plaintiffs bear different burdens when they bring
Section 1983 excessive force claims. These burdens depend on the
jurisdiction in which the alleged use of excessive force took place.
For example, a post-arrest, pre-charge detainee living in New York
City, for example, is afforded different constitutional protections in
an excessive force claim than a post-arrest, pre-charge detainee liv-
155 Cottrell v. Caldwell, 85 F.3d 1480 (11th Cir. 1996).
156 Id. at 1488.
157 Id.
158 Id. at 1490.
159 Id. at 1492.
160 Id.
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ing in Chicago, although both plaintiffs are bringing their claims
under the same statute. In an area as important as civil rights, the
Supreme Court should command that the law is applied uniformly
among the circuits. Therefore, the Supreme Court should grant cer-
tiorari to a case in which a post-arrest, pre-charge detainee brings a
Section 1983 excessive force claim against government officials for
conduct that occurs during the gap period.
The Supreme Court should define when seizure ends and pre-
trial detention begins. Once those boundaries are established, there
will be no question as to which constitutional protections post-ar-
rest, pre-charge detainees should be afforded. The Fourth Amend-
ment protections against excessive force apply during arrest,
investigatory stops, or other seizures. 161 Pre-trial detainees are pro-
tected by the Fourteenth Amendment prohibitions against force
that amounts to punishment. 162 Therefore, once the Supreme Court
decides when seizure ends and pretrial detention begins, the gap
period will disappear and post-arrest, pre-charge detainees will be
afforded the constitutional protection they deserve.
The majority of federal courts have adopted the continuing
seizure approach, 163 and the Supreme Court should do so as well.
The circuit courts have recognized the logic inherent in this ap-
proach, and the Supreme Court should take note of it. If the Su-
preme Court adopts the continuing seizure approach, it should
extend the definition of "seizure" until the post-arrest, pre-charge
detainee has had his first judicial appearance. 164 The post-arrest,
161 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989).
162 Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979).
163 See infra Parts II-IV.
164 This same circuit court split was addressed more than a decade ago. See
Karsch, supra note 24 (addressing this circuit court split). After analyzing the
continuing seizure and substantive due process approaches taken by the circuit
courts in determining whether to apply the Fourth Amendment or the Fourteenth
Amendment to excessive force claims made by post-arrest, pre-charge detainees,
Karsch proposed two "bright-line" rules to define when seizure ends and pre-trial
detention begins. In order to provide police officers with easily identifiable rules to
follow so as to avoid arbitrary searches and seizures, Karsch suggested that the
courts adopt a "probable cause" rule to address excessive force claims brought by'
plaintiffs who had been arrested without a warrant and a "first appearance" rule to
address excessive force claims brought by plaintiffs who had been arrested with a
warrant.
According to Karsch, courts should adopt the probable cause bright line rule
to define when seizure ends. All claims of excessive force that arise before the
probable cause hearing should be evaluated under the Fourth Amendment stan-
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dard. This rule is a variation on a probable cause rule proposed by a district court
in the Seventh Circuit. In Jones v. County of DuPage, 700 F. Supp. 965 (N.D. I11.
1988), an post-arrest, pre-charge detainee hanged himself while in an isolation cell,
after having been arrested on misdemeanor charges. The district court created the
probable cause rule, which states that in warrantless arrests, seizure ends and pre-
trial detention begins when the police take the arrestee before a judicial officer for
a probable cause determination. Jones, 700 F. Supp. at 971. The Jones court held
that the Fourth Amendment applies to the duration of a seizure until the individ-
ual is taken before a judicial officer, and as such, applies to the conditions of
seizure as well. Jones, 700 F. Supp. 965. After the arrestee is taken before a judicial
officer, he then becomes a pretrial detainee and is protected under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause. Jones, 700 F. Supp. 965.
Based on Jones, Karsch contends that the courts should adopt the probable
cause rule. Karsch argues that since courts, including the Supreme Court, have
applied Fourth Amendment analysis to claims arising out of incidents occurring
beyond the traditionally defined arrest, that extending Fourth Amendment protec-
tion against excessive force until the probable cause hearing would not constitute
an expansion of Fourth Amendment principles. He also contends that Graham
marked a movement toward Fourth Amendment analysis in these types of cases.
Since the Supreme Court held that a specific constitutional right must be identified
in excessive force claims, Karsch asserts that the probable cause rule will provide
guidance in doing so. He wrote, "because the probable cause rule bases its deter-
mination of the applicable constitutional right on an identifiable point in time, the
rule offers the courts precise guidance in applying the appropriate constitutional
right."
Additionally, Karsch argues that since the Fourth Amendment guarantees a
probable cause hearing to those arrested without a warrant, it already protects the
arrestee during his detention before his probable cause hearing. He further asserts
that the probable cause hearing changes the nature of the individual's incarcera-
tion because "it indicates that the individual's continuing detention is dependent
less upon an individual officer's assessment and more upon the routines and pro-
tections of the criminal justice system." According to Karsch, an individual ar-
rested without a warrant is vulnerable when arrested, and more likely to have a
more intense sense of fear until he comes before a judicial officer. Furthermore,
stricter Fourth Amendment protection is necessary to prevent overzealous conduct
by police officers.
Karsch contends that since the probable cause rule has "clear and certain
boundaries," it can easily be understood by police officers, thus eliminating the
need for case-by-case evaluation of when seizure ends and pretrial detention be-
gins. He further states that the probable cause rule is not subject to "manipulation
and abuse" since the Fourth Amendment guarantees a suspect timely judicial de-
termination of probable cause.
The probable cause rule would not protect those arrested with warrants, since
the probable cause hearing takes place before the arrest. Consequently, Karsch
proposed the "first appearance" rule, which extends the probable cause rule to
those arrested with warrants. Under the "first appearance" rule, the Fourth
Amendment would protect an individual against excessive force until his first ap-
pearance before a judicial officer. After his appearance, he would be considered a
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
pre-charge detainee would then become a "pretrial detainee" after
that appearance. Until the first judicial appearance takes place,
however, the Fourth Amendment would protect post-arrest, pre-
charge detainees against use of excessive force by the police. After
the first judicial appearance takes place, the post-arrest, pre-charge
detainee would become a pretrial detainee, and thus be protected
against the use of force that amounts to punishment by substantive
due process embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment.
165
The continuing seizure approach should be adopted over the
substantive due process approach for a number of reasons. First,
the continuing seizure approach carries with it a lighter burden of
proof for a post-arrest, pre-charge detainee alleging excessive
force.166 Plaintiffs alleging a Fourth Amendment violation must
prove that the police officer's use of force was unreasonable,
167
while plaintiffs alleging a Fourteenth Amendment violation must
prove that the police officer's use of force amounted to punish-
ment. 68 Furthermore, the Fourth Amendment test is purely objec-
tive, while the Fourteenth Amendment test is both subjective and
objective. 169 A post-arrest, pre-charge detainee who has yet to have
charges brought against him should be offered less burdensome
constitutional protections than those who have been charged with a
crime.
Second, the Supreme Court has expressed a preference for us-
ing the Fourth Amendment, as opposed to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, when appropriate. 70 In Graham v. Connor, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, writing for the majority, wrote, "Because the Fourth
Amendment provides an explicit textual source of constitutional
protection against this sort of physically intrusive governmental
conduct, that Amendment, not the more generalized notion of 'sub-
stantive due process,' must be the guide for analyzing these
pretrial detainee, and thus protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. Karsch offers
basically the same reasoning for employing the first appearance rule as he gives for
employing the probable cause rule. Karsch, supra note 24.
165 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520.
166 See discussion infra Part III.
167 See discussion infra Part IliA.
168 See discussion infra Part IIIB.
169 See discussion infra Part III.
170 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 842 (1998) (stating "Be-
cause we have 'always been reluctant to expand the concept of substantive due
process, we held in Graham v. Connor that... ") (citing Collins v. Harker Heights,
503 U.S. 115, 125 (1992)).
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claims. ' ' 171 The fact that the Chief Justice expressed a distaste for
substantive due process furthers the argument that the continuing
seizure rule should apply. A post-arrest, pre-charge detainee is still
in custody after he has been handcuffed. Therefore, the definition
of seizure should be extended to include the gap period so that the
Fourth Amendment, a specific source of constitutional protection,
can apply.
Moreover, in Albright v. Oliver,172 Justice Ginsburg joined the
plurality but wrote separately to voice her opinion on extending
Fourth Amendment protection to a claim brought by a plaintiff who
alleged, under Section 1983, that the defendant police officer de-
prived him of substantive due process under the Fourteenth
Amendment to be free from criminal prosecution except upon
probable cause. 173 Justice Ginsburg wrote,
A defendant incarcerated until trial no doubt suffers
greater burdens. That difference, however, should not
lead to the conclusion that a defendant released pre-
trial is not still "seized" in the constitutionally relevant
sense. Such a defendant is scarcely at liberty; he re-
mains apprehended, arrested in his movements, indeed
"seized" for trial, so long as he is bound to appear in
court and answer the state's charges. He is equally
bound to appear, and is hence "seized" for trial, when
the state employs the less strong-arm means of a sum-
mons in lieu of arrest to secure his presence in court.
174
Here, Justice Ginsburg was, in effect, employing the continuing
seizure approach. Although Justice Ginsburg was not applying the
continuing seizure approach in the context of an excessive force
claim, the preference for explicit textual protection is clearly stated.
Additionally, in County of Sacramento v. Lewis,175 Justice Souter,
writing for the majority stated,
Graham does not hold that all constitutional claims re-
lating to physically abusive government conduct must
arise under either the Fourth or Eighth Amendments;
171 Graham v. Connor 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
172 Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
173 Id. at 276 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
174 Id. at 278 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
175 County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833.
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rather, Graham simply requires that if a constitutional
claim is covered by a specific constitutional provision,
such as the Fourth or Eighth Amendment, the claim
must be analyzed under the standard appropriate to
that specific provision, not under the rubric of substan-
tive due process.1
76
Once again, the Court expressed its preference for Fourth
Amendment protection. Expanding the definition of "seizure" to
the gap period would enable the Supreme Court to find explicit
constitutional protection for post-arrest, pre-charge detainees.Third, courts that apply the substantive due process approach
often try to fit a claim of excessive force into the confines of the
Fourth Amendment. For example, in Pyka v. Village of Orland
Park, the decedent was involved in a car accident, after which the
defendant police officers arrested him and brought him to the po-
lice station.' 77 After they arrived at the police station, the defen-
dants allegedly taunted, threatened, and beat the him.178 Nearly
two hours after the alleged use of excessive force, the defendants
found the decedent hanging from his cell bars.179 He had appar-
ently committed suicide. In analyzing which constitutional protec-
tion to afford to the decedent, the district court adopted the
probable cause rule, and held that Fourth Amendment protections
applied to the time when plaintiff was allegedly beaten at the sta-
tion house. 80 This is in contrast to other Seventh Circuit decisions
to which the district court was supposedly bound.' 8'
176 Id. at 843 (citing United States v. Lanier, 520 U.S. 259, 272 n.7 (1997)).
177 Pyka v. Village of Orland Park, 906 F. Supp. 1196 (1995). The court
dubbed this "a tragic civil rights case." Id. Note also that this case was decided
after Albright v. Oliver. 510 U.S. 266 (1994).
178 Pyka v Village of Orland Park, 906 F. Supp. 1196.
179 Id.
180 The court stated, "Pyka was an arrestee protected by the Fourth Amend-
ment at the time that Officer McCarth grabbed him by the neck, held him in a
chokehold and forced him to the floor." Id. at 1217. In examining whether the
Fourth Amendment right was "clearly established," the court went on to analyze
the circuit court split and the ambiguity in the Seventh Circuit. See id. at 1219-25.
181 The district court stated:
The majority of circuit courts appear to be resolving the question in
favor of applying the Fourth rather than the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to conduct that occurs after the initial seizure or arrest but
before a formal hearing before a neutral judicial official. In the ab-
sence of any clearer authority from the Seventh Circuit to the con-
trary, and after careful consideration of the facts in this case, the
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A similar case came up in the Eleventh Circuit, which also ap-
plies substantive due process protection to post-arrest, pre-charge
detainees. In Albritten v. Dougherty County, the plaintiff brought a
claim of excessive force against defendant police officers after they
allegedly shoved, choked, pulled, dragged, kicked, kneed, ripped his
clothes off, and strapped his leg to an iron bar while he was naked,
and while he was in custody at the station house after being ar-
rested on drunk driving charges. 1 2 In response to the plaintiff's in-
quiry about why they were treating him so roughly one of the
defendants allegedly said, "I'm tired of y'all niggers."'1 83 After re-
viewing the circuit court split and the ambiguity in the Eleventh
circuit, the district court held that it would apply the continuing
seizure rule.
184
Pyka and Albritten exemplify the need for the Supreme Court
to resolve this circuit court split. District courts in the Seventh and
Eleventh Circuits created a different standard than their respective
circuit courts previously identified. This makes it very difficult for
police officers working in these circuits to know what their bounda-
ries are. Furthermore, since the courts in these two cases used the
Fourth Amendment to analyze the post-arrest, pre-charge detain-
ees' claims of excessive force, and the use of force was particularly
Court finds that the defendants' conduct on the night Pyka died
should be judged by a Fourth Amendment reasonableness stan-
dard. Pyka was never formally charged nor was he brought before a
neutral judicial officer for a probable cause determination (i.e., the
arrest, assuming it was supported by probable cause, was still war-
rantless). Thus, this Court will apply a Fourth Amendment reasona-
bleness standard in this case for the simple reason that Pyka was
protected by the Fourth Amendment under the clearly established
law in this circuit on the night of his death.
Id. at 1225; see also infra text accompanying Part IVB.
182 Albritten v. Dougherty County, 973 F. Supp. 1455, 1456-7 (M.D. Ga.
1997).
183 Id. at 1457.
184 Id. at 1459-60. The court held:
Based on a review of the holdings of the Courts of Appeals of other
circuits, and for the reasons discussed below, this court finds (1)
that the undisputed facts of the instant action indicate that plain-
tiff's arrest had not ended at the time of defendants' alleged use of
excessive force, and (2) that the Fourth Amendment applies to
plaintiff's excessive force claims even if plaintiff was in post-arrest,
pre-charge custody at the time of the use of such force.
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extreme here, it sends plaintiffs a message that they will get Fourth
Amendment protection only if the use of force is gross enough to
warrant it.
Fourth, the continuing seizure rule would put police officers on
notice of what type of force they can use and when they can use it.
Police officers are allowed to use both psychological and physical
force in carrying out their duties. 185 However, use of excessive force
should never be acceptable. Excepting post-arrest, pre-charge de-
tainees, the Supreme Court has defined which constitutional pro-
tections extend to victims of excessive force. 186 Each constitutional
protection bears a different standard in terms of proving which
rights have been violated. 187 As an individual moves from being a
free citizen to being an detained citizen to being a citizen convicted
of the crime, the burdens he or she must bear in proving that his or
her rights against use of excessive force have been violated, get
higher and higher.188 Consequently, the legal amount of force a po-
lice officer can use gets higher and higher. However, if the Supreme
Court adopts the continuing seizure approach, the police will have a
better gauge of when to use what type of force. If police officers
feel the need to use more force than necessary, the threat of a Sec-
tion 1983 lawsuit may encourage police officers to think before they
act, and to use the appropriate amount of force against an individ-
ual, depending on his status as a seized individual, a pretrial de-
tainee, or an inmate.
Finally, settling this circuit court split is very important in an
era when excessive force by police officers is commonplace and has
been thrust into the public eye.189 Further, some officers who com-
185 See Geoffrey P. Alpert and William C. Smith, How Reasonable is the Rea-
sonable Man?: Police and Excessive Force, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 481
(1994).
186 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520
(1979); Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
187 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520;
Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312.
188 See discussion infra Parts II-IV.
189 See e.g. Dan Luzadder, Safety Commission on the Hot Seat: Court of Last
Resort A Court of No Results for Many Who Complain of Police Misconduct,
DENY. ROCKY MTN. NEWS, May 21, 2000, at 4A; Alex Rodriguez, Inmate's Death
Puts Focus on Force: Many Face Allegations, But Not Criminal Charges, CHI.
TRIB., June 18, 2000, at 1; Valerie Schremp and Denise Hollinshed, Police Killings
of 2 Aim Scrutiny at Deadly Force, ST. Louis PosT DISPATCH, June 18, 2000, at Al;
Mitzi Grasso, Civilians Do Better At Judging Cop Misconduct, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 5,
2001, at B7; Greg Krikorian and Beth Shuster, Concern over Suits Leads To Re-
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mit these acts think they can get away with it, and thus continue
committing them. 190 As a result, civilians become more resentful
toward police officers because their use of force seems to go unpun-
ished.19' Conversely, this publicity could lead police officers to re-
frain from doing their jobs correctly, for fear of using too much
force or of being sued. If officers are aware of a set standard, then
they will be less prone to use excessive force and more prone to do
their jobs. Additionally, these amendments will either encourage
plaintiffs to file excessive force lawsuits based on the correct consti-
tutional right, or it will deter them from bringing frivolous law suits,
both of which will have the desired effect of increasing judicial
efficiency.
VI. CONCLUSION
Excessive force is a serious problem, for both police officers
and those who experience it. Despite the Supreme Court's holdings
and various scholarship on the issue of defining when seizure ends
and pretrial detention begins, the circuit courts are still split on
which constitutional protection to afford post-arrest, pre-charge de-
tainees who have been victims of use of excessive force by police
officers. As a result, the law is not being applied uniformly, plain-
tiffs residing in different jurisdictions bear different burdens, and
police officers do not have a set standard to follow when making
the decision of what kind of force they should use in a given
situation.
The Supreme Court should define when seizure ends and pre-
trial detention begins in order to resolve the circuit courts split and
the diminishing of individual rights that comes along with it. By do-
view of Sheriffs Use-of-Force Policy, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2001, at BI; Ruben
Castaneda, Prince George's Jury Acquits Injured Man: Laurel Officers' Account of
Arrest Is Rejected, WASH. POST, June 8, 2001, at Bi; Jeremy Milarsky, A Question
of Force: Police Agencies in South Florida and Across the Nation Work Hard to
Make Sure Their Officers Don't Cross the Line of Excessive Force, FT. LAUDER-
DALE SUN-SENTINEL, July 15, 2001, at IG; John M. Glionna, Oakland Police: Suc-
cess Story or Scandal?, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2001, at 1; Shelley Murphy, Officer
Faces U.S. Charges in Beating Case, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 10, 2002, at B1; Curtis
Lawrence, Use of Force Kept in Check, County Says, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Feb. 10,
2002, at 3.
190 See Rob Yale, Searching for the Consequences of Police Brutality, 70 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1841, 1842 (1997).
191 Id.
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ing so, the Court will enable those in Suspect A's and Suspect B's
position to have a better chance in succeeding in their excessive
force claims. Furthermore, the Court will demystify the legal twi-
light zone for the federal courts, and in so doing, help post-arrest,
pre-charge detainees vindicate their rights when they are en-
croached upon by the police.
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